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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its effort to impose liability on respondent, RDG 
Associates/Jorman Corporation ("RDG") for the payment of 
wages earned by employees of RDG's building contractor, T&K 
Steel, Inc. ("T&K"), appellant, The Industrial Commission of 
Utah (the "Commission"), has committed a monumental error: 
it has elected to premise liability under § 34-28-8 of the 
Utah Wage Payment Statute (§ 34-28-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
(1953)) rather than the Utah Bonding Statute contained in §§ 
14-2-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953). In proceeding in 
that manner, the Commission has either ignored or overlooked 
the only statutory basis even arguably imposing liability on 
RDG for payment of wages earned by T&K's employees. Because 
the Utah Bonding Statute specifically prescribes the 
circumstances under which a landowner such as RDG is liable 
for the payment of wages earned in connection with the 
conferring of improvements upon the landowner's property, 
the Commission's failure to proceed under that statute 
requires affirmance of the District Court's order of 
dismissal. 
While the Utah Wage Payment Statute unquestionably is 
designed to protect wage earners from the risk of nonpayment 
of wages under certain circumstances, it does not, as the 
Commission suggests, make a landowner (or any other obligor) 
an absolute guarantor for the payment of wages. A review of 
the predecessor provisions of the Utah Wage Payment Statute 
and case law from other jurisdictions interpreting similar 
statutes and a recognition of the policies and purposes 
underlying the Utah Wage Payment Statute establishes that 
the legislature never intended to make contracting parties 
an insurer of unpaid wages. Rather, the legislature 
intended only to prevent parties from seeking to avoid 
liability for the payment of wages owed to their own 
employees by contracting that work out to "independent 
contractors" rather than employing such persons directly. 
Basic rules of statutory construction and common sense 
interpretation militate against any conclusion that the Utah 
2 
Wage Payment Statute extends unqualifiedly to impose 
absolute liability on contracting parties for unpaid wages. 
The District Court's interpretation of the Utah Wage 
Payment Statute, as embodied in its order granting the 
Owner's motion for summary judgment dated November 18, 1985 
(the "Summary Judgment Order") should, accordingly, be 
affirmed, 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Determined 
That RDG Was Not Liable For 
The Payment Of Wages Earned By Employees 
Of Its Contractor 
A. The Utah Wage Payment Statute Was Intended To Impose 
Liability For Payment Of Wages Only On Parties Who 
Contracted Their Work Out To "Independent Contractors" 
Rather Than Employing Such Persons Directly. 
There is no question that § 34-28-8 of the Utah Wage 
Payment Statute is designed to protect wage earners from the 
nonpayment of wages under certain circumstances. 
Unfortunately, this is a case of first impression in the 
State of Utah and there are no cases defining the precise 
circumstances under which wage earners are entitled to its 
3 
protective provisions. In the District Court, the 
Commission asserted that the purpose of the statute was to 
give employees of a "subcontractor" who are not paid for 
their labor a remedy against the principal who ultimately 
benefits from the employees' efforts, even though as here, 
the principal (RDG) paid all amounts due to the 
contractor. Consequently, the Commission took the position 
that the statute contains absolutely no limitations, and 
imposes liability for unpaid wages on anyone who enters into 
a contract for the performance of work. 
A review of prior legislative enactments of the Utah 
Wage Statute and case law from another jurisdiction with a 
similar statute clearly demonstrates that the Utah 
legislature did not intend to make contracting parties an 
absolute insurer of unpaid wages. Rather, the legislature 
In general terms, the Utah Wage Payment Statute 
requires employers to make timely and regular payment 
of wages to their employees, to give notices of their 
rate and date of payment, to settle wages due promptly 
upon voluntary or involuntary severance and to keep 
specified payroll records. As this court has observed, 
the statute is ", . . apparently aimed at helping those 
whose employment contracts are silent on its subject 
matter." Action Electric Company v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 636 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1981). 
Thus, it would appear that only where it is 
demonstrated that a contracting party has failed to 
comply with those requirements can it be required to 
pay the wages of its subcontractor's employees. 
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Intended to prevent parties from avoiding certain statutory 
obligations/ including the payment of wages, which they owe 
to their own employees, by contracting such work out to 
"independent contractors" rather than employing such persons 
directly. 
In 1937/ the Utah legislature enacted the predecessor 
to the Utah Wage Payment Statute. This predecessor statute 
was codified as § 34-10-9/ Utah Code Ann. and provided as 
follows: 
"(a) Whenever an employer shall contract with 
another (herein called the subcontractor) for 
the performance of the employer's worky then 
it shall be the duty of such employer to 
provide in such contract that the employees 
of the subcontractor shall be paid according 
to the provisions of this act; and in the 
event that such subcontractor shall fail to 
pay wages to these employees as specified In 
this act/ such employer shall become civilly 
liable to the employees of the subcontractor 
to the extent that such work is performed 
under such contract in the same manner as if 
said employees were directly employed by such 
employer. 
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this 
section shall likewise be deemed applicable 
to any personf firm/ partnership/ association 
or corporation who not being an employer/ and 
hereinafter referred to in this act as an 
'indirect employer/1 contracts with a 
subcontractor for the performance of his 
work,." (Emphasis added). 
In 1941/ § 34-10-9 was amended to read as follows: 
"Whenever any person shall contract with 
another for the performance of work then it 
shall be the duty of such person to provide 
5 
in such contract that all wages earned 
pursuant to such contract shall be paid in 
accordance with the provisions of this act, 
and in the event that any wages earned under 
such contract shall not be paid as required 
in this act, such person shall be civilly 
liable for all wages for work performed under 
such contract in the same manner as if the 
employees entitled to such wages were 
directly employed by such person," (Emphasis 
added). 
On its face, it is apparent that the 1941 amendment rewrote 
paragraph (a) of the 1939 statute to eliminate the term 
"employer" and deleted subparagraph (b) (the definitional 
section of employer) in its entirety. Finally, in 1966, the 
Utah legislature repealed the entire chapter (Chapter 10) 
entitled Payment of Wages and recodified it in Chapter 28 
with no change other than the reference to "chapter" as 
opposed to "act." No other amendments to the Utah Wage 
Payment Statute have been made. 
As noted above, there is no judicial guidance as to the 
applicability of the former or present Utah Wrage Payment 
Statute or the purpose of the 1941 amendment. This type of 
statute, however, is not unique to the State of Utah. 
Kansas, for example, has an almost identical statute which 
provides as follows: 
"Whenever any such corporation shall contract 
any or all of its work to any contractor, 
then it shall become a duty of such 
corporation to provide that the employees of 
such corporation or contractor shall be paid 
according to the provisions of this act, and 
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such corporation shall become responsible and 
liable to the employees of such contractor in 
the same manner as if said employees were 
employed by such corporation," (Emphasis 
added). KSA § 44-306. 
In McGown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 529 P.2d 97 
(Kan. 1974), the Supreme Court of Kansas went to great 
lengths to explain the purposes and applicability of the 
foregoing provision (the "Kansas Wage Statute"). In McGown, 
the defendant telephone company entered into a contract with 
D&M Cable Company ("D&M") wherein D&M agreed to install an 
underground telephone cable for the defendant. The contract 
was terminated prior to the completion of the contract and 
the plaintiffs (who were employees of D&M) brought an action 
against the defendant telephone company for the payment of 
unpaid wages. 
The issue in McGown was whether the installation of 
underground cable was "work" of the defendant telephone 
company so as to make it liable under the Kansas Wage 
Statute. Since there was no Kansas case law defining the 
term "its work," the Kansas court was required to review the 
entire Kansas statutory scheme with respect to the 
protection of laborers to determine the purpose and 
applicability of the Kansas Wage Statute. In that review, 
the court focused on the Kansas workmen's compensation 
statute which imposed liability on persons for injuries and 
7 
lost wages suffered by direct employees or by the employees 
of a subcontractor with whom such person had contracted for 
the performance of work which was part of such person's 
"trade or business." As noted by the Kansas court, the 
purpose of the "trade or business" provision in the Kansas 
workmen's compensation statute was to prevent persons from 
avoiding the liability imposed therein by contracting away 
work which was part of their "trade or business" and 
claiming that the injured person was not a direct 
employee. Since there was and is no logical distinction 
between "unpaid wages" on the one hand, and "injuries and 
lost wages" on the other, the court in McGown determined 
that the purpose of the Kansas Wage Statute and the Kansas 
workmen's compensation statute was precisely the same: to 
prevent a corporation from evading statutory liability 
enacted to protect employees from contracting away its work 
to so-called independent contractors. 
After determining that the purpose of the two statutes 
was identical, the court in McGown found that the "trade or 
business" cases decided under the Kansas workmen's 
compensation statute were applicable to define the term "its 
work" under the Kansas Wage Statute. Since under those 
cases the installation of underground cable was clearly part 
of the defendant telephone company's "trade or business," 
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liability for unpaid wages under the Kansas Wage Statute was 
imposed• 
The Utah Wage Payment Statute at issue in this case is 
virtually identical to Kansas1. Moreover, the Utah 
workmen's compensation statute (§§ 35-1-1 et seq., (1953)), 
also is designed to prevent a person from evading the 
liability imposed therein by contracting away work within 
its "trade or business." Following the rationale set forth 
in McGown, this court should refer to the Utah statutory 
schemef particularly the Utah workmen's compensation 
statute/ to determine the purpose and applicability of the 
Utah Wage Payment Statute. 
In this casef RDGf as an owner of property, entered 
into a contract with T&K wherein T&K agreed to construct 
condominiums on RDG's property. Under Utah lawf RDGf by 
this contract/ did not contract away work which was part of 
its "trade or business." In the words of the District Court, 
it was "not regularly engaged in the construction business." 
(R. 97, 98). Therefore, under a long line of Utah workmen's 
compensation cases holding that the making of a contract for 
the construction of a building by one who is not engaged in 
the construction business does not constitute the conducting 
of a "trade or business"/ RDG's delegation of work to T&K 
does not amount to the contracting away of its work. See, 
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e.g. , Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1977). 
Thus, under the rationale of McGown and by analogy to the 
Utah workmen's compensation statute, RDG is not liable for 
the wages T&K failed to pay its employees. The District 
Court correctly applied that rationale and analogy in 
entering the Summary Judgment Order. 
B, Only The Specific Utah Bonding Statute And Not The 
General Utah Wage Payment Statute Can Be Used To Impose 
Liability On A Landowner For Unpaid Wages Earned By 
Employees Of The Landowner's Contractor. 
Beginning in 1915, the Utah Legislature enacted 
specific legislation for the protection of laborers whose 
efforts conferred a benefit on the owner of an interest in 
land. That legislation, which evolved through amendments in 
1917, 1933, 1943 and 1977, is now embodied in § 14-2-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended). That section now provides that: 
"The owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair 
of, any building, structure, or improvement upon 
land shall, before any such work is commenced, 
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal 
to the contract price, with good and sufficient 
sureties, condition for the faithful performance 
of the contract and prompt payment for material 
furnished, equipment and materials rented, and 
labor performed under the contract." (Emphasis 
added). 
Section 14-2-2 of the Utah Bonding Statute provides that any 
person who fails to obtain such a bond, " . . . shall be 
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personally liable to all persons who have furnished 
materials or performed labor under the contract . . . ." 
The Commission elected not to proceed under the Utah 
Bonding Statute. Rather, it sought to impose liability 
against the Owner under § 34-28-8 of the Utah Wage Payment 
Statute which provides: 
"Subcontractors — Compliance with act. 
— Whenever any person shall contract with 
another for the performance of work, then it 
shall be the duty of such person to provide 
in the contract that all wages earned 
pursuant to the contract shall be paid in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter, and in the event that any wages 
earned under the contract shall not be paid 
as required in this act, such person shall be 
civilly liable for all wages for work 
performed under such contract in the same 
manner as if the employees entitled to such 
wages were directly employed by such person." 
The presence of two separate statutes, both governing 
the obligation of contracting parties to pay wages earned by 
employees of one of the contracting parties, renders the 
statutes in pari materia. That is, both of the statutes 
relate to the same subject matter and were enacted for the 
same general purpose. Once it is demonstrated that two 
statutes are in fact in pari materia, the following "well-
established rule of statutory construction"2 applies: 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). 
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"In terms of legislative intent, it is 
assumed that whenever the legislature enacts 
a provision it has in mind previous statutes 
relating to the same subject matter, 
wherefore it is held that in the absence of 
any express repeal or amendment therein, the 
new provision was enacted in accord with the 
legislative policy embodied in those prior 
statutes, and they all should be construed 
together. 
Provisions in an act which are omitted 
in another act relating to the same subject 
matter will be applied in a proceeding under 
the other act, when not inconsistent with its 
purposes. Prior statutes relating to the 
same subject matter are to be compared with 
the new provisions; and if possible by 
reasonable construction, both are to be so 
construed that effect is given to every 
provision in all of them." 2A, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, § 51.02, at 290 (4th 
Ed. 1983). 
Application of that rule of statutory construction 
requires, therefore, that each of the statutes — the Utah 
Wage Payment Statute and the Utah Bonding Statute — be 
interpreted in the manner most likely to give full effect to 
each. Clearly, that can be accomplished only by 
interpreting the Utah Wage Payment Statute as not applying 
to situations in which laborers are conferring an economic 
benefit on a landowner's property. Those situations are 
expressly contemplated, and their consequences specified, in 
the Utah Bonding Statute. By its terms, the Utah Bonding 
Statute is demonstrably more specific in scope. It makes 
specific provision for the payment of laborers' wages by the 
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landowner whose property is benefited. By contrast, the 
Utah Wage Payment Statute prescribes the obligations imposed 
on persons who use subcontractors to perform work which 
would otherwise be performed by such persons. It is clearly 
more general in scope and must be construed as not applying 
to situations explicitly set forth in a separate statutory 
provision such as the Utah Bonding Statute. 
Under that analysis, the District Court properly 
concluded that where, as here, liability is sought to be 
imposed on a landowner for payment of wages earned by 
employees of the landowner's contractor, the specific Utah 
Bonding Statute and not the more General Wage Payment 
Statute applies. 
C. The District Court's Interpretation Of § 34-28-8 Of The 
Utah Wage Payment Statute Avoids Disastrous And 
Punitive Consequences Which Were Never Intended By The 
Utah Legislature. 
In seeking reversal of the Summary Judgment Order, the 
Commission urges this court to ignore common sense 
limitations respecting the types of contracts to which the 
Utah Wage Payment Statute applies. 
The breadth of the Commission's interpretation is best 
highlighted by the following hypothetical: Upon discovering 
that his lawn mower is inoperable, a homeowner takes the 
lawn mower to Mower, Inc., to have the engine repaired. 
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After examining the lawn mower, the manager of Mower, Inc. 
agrees to make the repairs for $50, and a work order is 
prepared and signed by the homeowner. Two days later, the 
homeowner returns to Mower, Inc.f pays the sum of $50f and 
returns home with his lawn mower. The lawn mower works 
perfectly and the homeowner is satisfied with the 
transaction. Unfortunately, Mower, Inc. fails to pay its 
mechanic his hourly wage. After reviewing the work order, 
the mechanic determines that he spent three hours repairing 
the homeowner's lawn mower and files a wage claim against 
the homeowner for the wages he should have been paid by 
Mower, Inc. According to the Commission's interpretation of 
the Utah Wage Payment Statute, the homeowner is liable to 
pay the mechanic's wages. Indeed, under the Commission's 
unbridled interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute, 
the only way that the homeowner could be assured that he 
would not be liable for Mower, Inc.'s employee's unpaid 
wages would be for the homeowner to pay the employee's wages 
directly. 
The number of similar hypotheticals which reach the 
same result is infinite; no attempt to set forth all 
possible hypotheticals will be made in this brief. Suffice 
it to state that the interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment 
Statute advanced by the Commission does nothing less than 
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make any person who enters into a contract for the 
performance of services an insurer of all wages earned as a 
result of such contract• In light of the fact that a huge 
percentage of this State's economy consists of service-
oriented industry, the devastating consequences of the 
Commission's interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute 
cannot be understated. 
Clearly, under the former Utah Wage Payment Statute (§ 
34-10-9, Utah Code Ann.)/ or the interpretation given the 
Kansas Wage Statute, the result in the above-described 
hypothetical would be different. The homeowner in the 
hypothetical, like RDG in this case, was not attempting to 
evade the liability imposed on him by the Utah Wage Payment 
Statute or the workmen's compensation statutes by entering 
into a contract for services to be performed. Application 
of the Utah Wage Payment Statute in such a situation is 
indefensible: To justify the Commission's interpretation of 
the existing Utah Wage Payment Statute, one must imply that 
the Utah legislature, by the 1941 amendment, truly intended 
to expand the reach and breadth of the Utah Wage Payment 
Statute by making all persons who enter into contracts an 
insurer of wages earned as a result of such contract. Such 
an implication is simply not justified. The 1941 amendment 
did nothing more than condense and simplify the Utah Wage 
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Payment Statute by substituting the term "person" for the 
term "employer" and eliminating the cumbersome definition of 
the term "employer." 
The effort to condense and simplify statutory sections 
is frequently attempted by the Utah legislature without any 
intent to radically change the meaning of the statute. In 
Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959), for 
example, the plaintiff argued that the Utah legislature, by 
compiling several mechanic's lien statutes into one 
statutory section, intended to increase the scope of the 
lien statute. In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
"The argument that the legislature in 
adopting the 1933 compilation of the code 
consolidating these lien statutes into one 
section intended to effect a radical change 
in the meaning of the whole statute would 
dignify the action of the legislature beyond 
what actually happened. If a departure from 
the traditional coverage of the lien laws is 
to be effected it should be by a clear 
manifestation of intent of the legislature 
than is shown in the Tianner in which this 
statute has come to its present form." Id. 
at 210. 
As was the case in Stanton, it cannot be said that the 
legislature, by rewriting the Utah Wage Payment Statute to 
eliminate the cumbersome definition contained in paragraph 
(b) thereof, manifested an intent to expand radically the 
scope of the statute. 
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Finallyf it is clear that the compilers of the Utah 
Code did not understand the 1941 Amendment or the 1966 
enactment of the Utah wage statute to expand its 
applicability. The Utah Wage Payment Statute, as amended in 
1941, was entitled "Employer liable to employees of 
subcontractor." This statutory heading was used despite the 
fact that the 1941 amendment substituted the term "person" 
for the term "employer" and eliminated the cumbersome 
definition of the term "employer" which was contained in 
subparagraph (b). The 1966 enactment of the Utah Wage 
Payment statute, merely reenacted § 34-10-9, Utah Code Ann. 
into Chapter 28 of Title 34 with no change except for the 
reference to "chapter" is entitled "Subcontractors 
compliance with act." These headings clearly indicate that 
the legislature did not intend to radically expand the 
applicability of the Utah Wage Payment Statute. As a 
consequence, there is little doubt that the Utah legislature 
did not intend, by the 1941 amendment, to enlarge the scope 
of the Utah Wage Payment Statute. 
The Utah Wage Payment Statute is specifically designed 
to prevent persons from evading statutory employer liability 
by simply contracting away work which would otherwise have 
been performed by such person's direct employees. The 
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District Court's perceptive recognition of that purpose is 
reflected in the Summary Judgment Order. 
D. The Principle Of Applying The "Plain Meaning11 Of A 
Statute Is Not Violated By The District Court's Summary 
Judgment Order. 
In its brief, the Commission accurately observes that 
the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature in enacting [legislation] is the plain 
language . . . " (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). However, it is 
equally clear that this court has, on several occasions, 
interpreted a broad and seemingly unambiguous statute to 
give it "true meaning". In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 
390 P.2d 915 (1964), the court interpreted the tolling 
provision contained in § 78-12-35, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
which provided that: 
"If when a cause of action accrues 
against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term 
herein limited after his return to the state, 
and if after a cause of action accrues he 
departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action." (Emphasis 
added). 
In that case, the record established that plaintiff had 
commenced her lawsuit four years and three days after her 
accident. In an effort to avoid the statute of limitations, 
plaintiff contended that because defendants returned to 
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their home state of California immediately after the 
accident, the statute of limitations was tolled for the 
duration of their absence from Utah. In rejecting that 
contention, the court observed that: 
"It is to be conceded that upon a 
superficial look at the above section, 
ignoring all other considerations, its 
literal wording might seem to indicate that 
where a defendant departs from the state 
after a cause of action arises, the time of 
his absence should not be counted as part of 
the time of the limitation. But statutes of 
necessity must state their objectives in 
general language. It is not always possible 
to foresee and prescribe in precise detail 
for all situations to which they might apply. 
Attempts to give them universal and literal 
application frequently lead to incongruous 
results which were never intended. When it 
is obvious that this is so, the statute 
should not be so applied. In order to give a 
statute its true meaning and significance it 
should be considered in the light of its 
background and the purpose sought to be 
accomplished, together with other aspects of 
the law which have a bearing on the problem 
involved." Id. at 915-16. (Emphasis added). 
In declining to interpret the statute literally without 
reference to its underlying purpose and the existence of 
other relevant legislation, the court held that because a 
later statute authorized service upon a non-resident 
motorist by serving the Secretary of State, the defendant's 
physical departure from the state did not constitute an 
"absence" from the state within the meaning of the tolling 
statute. Accordingly, the court found the action to be time 
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barred even though the defendant had in fact departed from 
the state. The same principles of statutory construction 
were endorsed and applied in Howell v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 
269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966)• 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the apparently expansive 
terms of the Utah Wage Payment Statute are arguably so broad 
as to regulate RDG's liability for payment of wages earned 
by its contractor's employees. However, application of the 
statute in the manner the Commission seeks would clearly 
lead to bizarre and "incongruous" results. Only by limiting 
the application of the Utah Wage Payment Statute to 
situations in which a contracting party is contracting or 
delegating a portion of its work to purported independent 
contractors for the purpose of circumventing wage 
obligations does the Utah Wage Payment Statute make any 
sense. 
Previous pronouncements of this court support RDG's 
position that the Utah Wage Payment Statute like any other 
legislation, must be interpreted in a sensible manner 
consistent with actual legislative intent. American Coal 
Company v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This 
court's primary responsibility in construing legislation is 
to give effect to the intent of the legislature."); Stahl v. 
Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah L980) ("It is 
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also our duty to construe a statutory provision so as to 
make it harmonious with other statutes relevant to the 
subject matter."); United States Smelting, Refining & Mining 
Company v. Nielsen, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 P.2d 199, 201 ("But 
it is true here, as it is practically everywhere in the law, 
that all of the law is not stated and cannot be stated in 
one provision* These [workmen's compensation] statutes must 
be looked at together, in the light of established rules of 
statutory construction, with a view to reconciling any 
apparent conflict and giving each of them effect according 
to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished."); 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781, 
783 ("The statutes we have referred to should be considered 
together and in connection with the entire act and 
harmonized insofar as possible . . . . " ) . 
Moreover, it is a well-established principle of 
statutory construction that penal statutes which seek to 
impose statutory penalties of the type at issue in this case 
must be strictly construed. 2A, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, § 59.03 (4th Ed. 1973). That principle has 
been clearly expressed as follows: 
"It is a well-established principle of 
statutory construction that penal statutes 
must be strictly construed in determining the 
liability of the person upon whom the penalty 
is imposed, and that the more severe the 
penalty, and the more disastrous the 
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consequence to the person subjected to the 
provision of the statutef the more rigid will 
be the construction of its provisions in 
favor of such person and against the 
enforcement of such law," Missouri K. & T.R. 
Co. v. State, 100 Texas 420, 100 S.W. 766, 
767 (1907). 
Clearly, in this case, it is difficult to conceive of a 
penalty more devastating to a landowner than being required 
to pay its contractor's employees after once paying the 
contractor. Making a landowner responsible for all such 
wages renders it a statutory guarantor of full payment. As 
a penal provision, the Utah Wage Payment Statute must be 
both strictly and sensibly construed. The Summary Judgment 
Order appropriately reflects that construction. 
CONCLUSION 
There are at least five separate bases on which the 
District Court properly premised its decision not to apply 
the Utah Wage Payment Statute in the manner urged by the 
Commission. First, the evolution of the predecessor 
versions of the Utah Wage Payment Statute and the 
application of an almost identical statute by the Kansas 
Supreme Court strongly suggests that the legislature 
intended only to impose liability on contracting parties for 
the payment of wages earned by employees of subcontractors 
who performed work that would otherwise have been performed 
by the contracting parties. As such, the Utah Wage Payment 
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Statute cannot be viewed as making contracting parties, 
under all conceivable circumstances, absolute guarantors of 
wage obligations. Second, the Utah Bonding Statute 
expressly addresses the issue of a landowner's liability for 
the payment of wages earned in connection with the 
improvement of a landowner's property. That is the only 
statute that even arguably applies in this case. Third, 
literal interpretation of the Utah Wage Payment Statute 
leads to devastating results never intended by the 
legislature. Fourth, the "plain meaning" of the Utah Wage 
Payment Statute is not violated by the imposition of common 
sense limitations on legislation which, of necessity, is 
general in scope. Finally, as a penal statute, the Utah 
Wage Payment Statute must be strictly construed. 
The District Court correctly applied these principles 
in entering the Summary Judgment Order. It is respectfully 
submitted that this court should affirm that determination. 
DATED this /(? day of June, 1986. 
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